

# Thant Holds U.A.R. Responsible for 'Direct Confrontation' That Led to Mideast War

**REPORT ALSO SAYS ISRAEL BEARS ONUS**

**Assembly Gets Account of Withdrawal of the U.N. Emergency Force**

Continued From Page 1, Col. A

In 1966 after the Suez conflict, was originally designed to move into areas of the United Arab Republic that had been occupied by forces of Israel, Britain and France. Later it was ordered to return to its original purpose, the Israeli-Egyptian border and at Sharm el Sheikh, which controls the Strait of Tiran.

Egyptian troops moved up to the frontier, the anti-aircraft gun Sharm el Sheikh, on May 16 and ordered the United Nations troops out of their positions without prior notice to Mr. Thant. The Egyptian leader, President Gamal Abdel Nasser's Government called for full withdrawal of the "U.N. Emergency Force."

Mr. Thant said the withdrawal of the force at Cairo's request May 16 was "a clear violation of depth and danger the undiminished conflict between Israel and Egypt." The situation had flared into armed hostilities June 5.

But the Secretary General repeated the assertion that there was no legal or political basis for leaving the 2,400-man peacekeeping force. It had been deployed for a decade with Egyptian consent.

Other critics who have said that Mr. Thant should have submitted a proposal on withdrawal of the force to the General Assembly before acting on Cairo's request, Mr. Thant said he had been unable to maintain his position because it had been voted, or its consequences foreseen. If a greater force had been sent, he said, the U.N.E.F. would have remained in the area against the will of the Government of the United Arab Republic.

**Supply Problems Noted**

Mr. Thant said that it was impossible to supply the United Nations troops without Egyptian cooperation, and also that it was likely that a two-thirds majority could be obtained in the Assembly for measures to maintain the Cairo decision if refusal to accept the force any longer.

"It is questionable to say the least whether the necessary support could have been mustered had the force been withdrawn," Mr. Thant said.

Mr. Thant said that two of the seven nations that had previously voted in favor of the Emergency Force had advised him upon the United Arab Republic to withdraw its troops from the Suez Canal, and that they were pulling out their troops.

The two countries known to have been India and Yugoslavia, which look strongly pro-Arab positions in the Security Council, had voted against Assembly.

The other countries providing troops were Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. These nations plus Ceylon, Colombia, Chile, Peru and the Emergency Force Advisory Committee.

Mr. Thant informed the committee on May 18 of the decision to comply with the request while the United Arab Republic had objected but offered a slow alternative. In this, he said, the Secretary General himself did not believe that way useful purpose would be served by his seeking a resolution of the matter in the Security Council or the Assembly. Mr. Thant said in his report.

**Council Session Called**

Council called the Security Council in session when the United Arab Republic announced it would prevent passage of the resolution to close the Strait of Tiran the entrainment to the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea, through her gateway to the East.

The controversy over Mr. Thant's report to the United Arab Republic's decision to terminate the Emergency Force is likely to continue despite the heavy opposition.


Israel contends that when she withdrew her troops from the Suez Canal and Sharm el Sheikh in February 1957, it was on the basis of a pledge from President Nasser and Dag Hammarskjold, then Secretary General, that Press desirous of peace and mutual commitment to never again make these areas a cause of belligerency.

In reference to these understandings Foreign Minister Abba Eban of Israel said in October that when the United Arab Republic believed last month that it had "Soviet support" to go to war, it had arrangements which had been decided in 1957 to make Gaza and the rest of the east bank free of foreign influence.

Israel sources say that full support of Arab heads of state to live up to the arrangements is one reason why Israel will not accept any settlement that does not include a public commitment by the Arab countries for a long-term peace.

**A Johnson Nephew Entitled to U.S. Visa**

A nephew of President Johnson, Rodney White of Austin has enlisted in the Navy's Reserve Officer Training Center said today. The 18-year-old youth, son of Mrs. John C. and Mrs. Willard White. His mother was the former Jessie Johnson, the President's sister, according to Navy records.



EXCHANGE: Israeli guard overseeing Jordanians at Allenby Bridge yesterday, where two Israeli pilots were exchanged for 425 Jordanian prisoners and two Iraqi officials.

Associated Press Broadcast

Continued From Page 1, Col. A

## Two Israeli Fliers Are Exchanged for 428 Arabs

By JAMES PERON  
Special to The New York Times

JERUSALEM, Jordan, June 27

Two Israeli pilots were exchanged today at the Allenby Bridge for 425 Jordanian prisoners and two Iraqi officials.

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Two Israeli fliers were exchanged for 428 Arab prisoners and three Iraqi consular officials.

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# Secretary General's Account of 'Main Points at Issue' and the Legal Background

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withdrawal was received. It is also pertinent to note that in response to a query from the Secretary General as to why the United Arab Republic had withdrawn its troops from the Suez Canal, the Secretary General was actually an route to Cairo on 23 May, President Nasser informed that he had been informed that the route blockades had been taken some time before U Thant's departure and it was considered preferable to make the announcement before rather than after the Secretary General's visit to Cairo.

## The Question of Consultations

37. It has been said also that there was no adequate consultation with the organs of the United Nations concerned or with the members before the decision was taken to withdraw the Force. The Secretary General was, and is, firmly of the opinion that the force withdrawal was the responsibility of the host Government, rested with the Secretary General after consultation with the Advisory Committee on U.N.E.F. which is the body established by the General Assembly for consultation regarding such matters. This was made clear by Secretary General Hammarskjöld, who took the following position during his tour of Egypt in regard to a question about the withdrawal of the force from Sharm el Sheikh:

"An indicated procedure procedure would be to consult with the General Assembly and the Advisory Committee on U.N.E.F. which would determine whether the matter should be brought to the attention of the Assembly. [Official Document, General Assembly, Eleventh Session, annexes agenda item 85, document A/3063, annex I, p. 2.]

The Secretary General consulted the Advisory Committee before sending the letter of 16 May 1967 from the United Arab Republic requesting withdrawal. This consultation took place within a few hours after receipt of the United Arab Republic's request and the Advisory Committee was thus quickly informed of the decision which the Secretary General had in mind to convey in his letter to the Secretary General of the United Arab Republic as indicated in the report to the Security Council of 26 May 1967.

"The Committee did not agree, as it was asked to do under the terms of paragraph 9 of General Assembly resolution 1001 (S/8-I) to request the consent of the General Assembly on the situation which had arisen" (S/7904, para. 3).

38. Before consulting the Advisory Committee on U.N.E.F. the Secretary General had also consulted the permanent representatives of the member countries concerning the contingencies of U.N.E.F. and informed them of his intentions. This in fact was more than was formally required of the Secretary General in this case.

39. Obviously, many Governments were concerned about the presence and functioning of U.N.E.F. and about the general situation in the area. It would have been reasonable for the Secretary General to consult all of the interested representatives within any reasonable time. This was an emergency situation requiring prompt action. However, it is perfectly clear that such consultations were sure to produce sharply divided counsels, even if they were limited to the members of the General Assembly and the Council. Such sharply divided advice would have complicated and exacerbated the situation, and far from relieving the Secretary General of his responsibilities, would have made him liable to be blamed for having made the decision much more difficult to take.

40. It has been said that the final decision to withdraw U.N.E.F. should have been taken only after consideration by the General Assembly. This position is not only incorrect but also misleading. The General Assembly had already established a United Nations command for an emergency intervention force. On the basis of that resolution the force was quickly recruited and sent to the staging areas at Naples. Thus, though established, it had to await the permission of the Government of Egypt to enter Egyptian territory. That permission was reluctantly given by the Government of Egypt as a result of direct discussions between Secretary General Hammarskjöld and President Nasser of Egypt. The Secretary General's position document on the basis of which any case could be made that there was any limitation on the authority of the Secretary General to take the "good faith" consent at his pleasure, or which would indicate that the United Arab Republic had in any way surrendered its right to ask for consent at any time, is the report of U.N.E.F. from 14 May. This point is elaborated later in this report (see para. 71 below).

41. As a practical matter, there would be little time in any case taken up in the General Assembly in which there would body could be expected expeditiously to reach a substantial decision. In the meantime, the question could have been validly raised as to what decision other than the withdrawal of U.N.E.F. could have been reached by the Assembly. The United Arab Republic's consent for the continued presence of U.N.E.F. was withdrawn.

## The Proceedings In the United Nations

YESTERDAY  
(June 27, 1967)  
GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Heard statements by Ahmed Balafrej, personal representative of King Hussein of Jordan; Dr. M. Pachachi of Iraq; Chief Anthony Nahoro of Nigeria; Foreign Minister Nicanor Diaz of Argentina; Dr. Max Jakobson of Finland; Abdurrahman Aliyev of Turkmenia; Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey; Dr. Luis Alfonso de Zamacona and Joseph Ben Mwenze of Zambia.

TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL  
Continued examination of conditions in New Guinea.  
SCHEDULED FOR TODAY  
(June 28, 1967)

GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
Meets at 10:30 A.M. and 3 P.M.

of the Assembly considering the request for U.N.E.F.'s withdrawal. It is relevant to observe that the next regular session of the General Assembly came some months after the withdrawal and the withdrawal request was made. The special session of the General Assembly which was met to consider the question, according to rule 19 of the Assembly's rules of procedure only if two-thirds or 82 members voted for the motion of item 85 on the agenda. It is questionable, however, whether the necessary support could have been mustered for such a controversial item. There could have been no emergency procedure for the consideration of motions before the Security Council, and therefore the condition of lack of unanimity did not exist.

43. As a consultation with respect to the Security Council was concerned, the Secretary General reported to the Council on the situation leading up to and created by the withdrawal of U.N.E.F. on 25 May 1967. In that report it was noted that report be characterized the situation in the Near East as "extremely interesting." The Council met for the first time after the report on 24 May 1967, but took no action.

44. As has already been stated, the Advisory Committee did not make any move to bring the matter before the General Assembly. Any representative of any Member Government requested a meeting of either the Security Council or the General Assembly immediately following the withdrawal of U.N.E.F. (A/16750 and A/17562). In this situation, the Secretary General himself did not believe that any useful purpose would be served by his seeking a meeting of either one or both of these bodies until there was basis for him to do so at that time. Furthermore, the information available to the Secretary General did not lead him to believe that the General Assembly or the Security Committee would have decided that U.N.E.F. should remain on United Arab Republic territory, by final 16 May, necessary decisions with French and Israeli delegations, the negotiations of the Government of the United Arab Republic that it should

be continued. An indicated procedure would be to consult with the General Assembly on U.N.E.F. which is the body established by the General Assembly for consultation regarding such matters. This was made clear by Secretary General Hammarskjöld, who took the following position during his tour of Egypt in regard to a question about the withdrawal of the force from Sharm el Sheikh:

### Practical Factors Influencing the Decision

45. Since it is still contended in some quarters that U.N.E.F.'s operation should somehow have continued in the United Arab Republic until its presence was withdrawn, it is necessary to consider the factors quite apart from constitutional and legal considerations which would have made such a course of action entirely impracticable.

46. The consent and active cooperation of the local population is essential for the effective operation of the force. The fact that U.N.E.F. was stationed in the United Arab Republic for the withdrawal of U.N.E.F. over a period of 10 years with the consent and cooperation of the Government of the United Arab Republic is well known. It was the result of the actions of General Assembly Resolution 1125 (XI) of 2 February 1967 that the force would be stationed on both sides of the line, Israel and Egypt, in Egyptian-controlled territory for over 10 years with the consent and cooperation of the Government of the United Arab Republic. The force was stationed on the United Arab Republic side of the United Arab Republic's border with Israel.

47. In these circumstances, the true basis for U.N.E.F.'s effectiveness as a buffer and deterrent to infiltration was throughout its existence along the entire border zone along the Suez Canal. The force was not deployed from the rear, and the force throughout its existence was stationed on the United Arab Republic side of the United Arab Republic's border with Israel.

48. If it may be pointed out in passing that the last year U.N.E.F. dealt with numerous infiltrators coming from the United Arab Republic, it would be reasonable to assume that the United Arab Republic would be excluded. This understanding was honored although U.N.E.F. was not deployed from the rear of United Arab Republic troops to be present anywhere on their own territory.

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50. There are other practical factors relating to the withdrawal of U.N.E.F. which are highly relevant to the withdrawal of U.N.E.F. First, the United Arab Republic troops moved up to the line of demarcation with the military forces of Israel. U.N.E.F. had in fact, no further useful function. Secondly, if the force was no longer welcome, it could not as a practical matter be withdrawn from the United Arab Republic, since the friction which would almost inevitably have arisen with that Government, its armed forces and with the local population would be too great. The force would be humiliating and untenable. It would have been impossible to supply it with food and water, and it would have been slow in coming if friend had been forced to move freely about on their own territory.

51. For all the foregoing reasons, the operation and even the continual existence of U.N.E.F. on United Arab Republic territory was impossible and any attempt to maintain the force there would without question have had disastrous consequences.

42. As regards the practical possibility



United Nations  
U.N.E.F. AT ONCE LOST ALL USEFULNESS: The UN flag was lowered May 19 at King's Gate checkpoint on road between Gaza and Tel Aviv.

## Legal and Constitutional Considerations and the Question of Consent for the Stationing of U.N.E.F. on United Arab Republic Territory

### Arab Republic Territory

52. Legal and constitutional considerations were, of course, of great importance in determining the Secretary General's actions in relation to the request of the General Assembly for the withdrawal of U.N.E.F. The fact that U.N.E.F. was a peace-keeping operation of the United Nations was clearly important in this respect.

53. 4 November 1966. The General Assembly, at its first emergency special session in Resolution 98 (S/8-I), requested "the Secretary General to submit a report to the General Assembly on the stationing and operation of U.N.E.F. on United Arab Republic territory, with the consent of the United Arab Republic, and to advise the General Assembly of the relevant actions in 1966 and 1957 may be helpful."

54. It is clear that the General Assembly, in its Resolution 1125 (XI) of 2 February 1967, requested the Secretary General to "take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the resolution."

55. 5 November 1966. The General Assembly, in its Resolution 1001 (S/8-I), established a United Nations Command for the organization and functioning of U.N.E.F. in accordance with the principles of "good faith" and "aid-memoire" and the Government of the United Arab Republic.

56. 5 November 1966. The General Assembly, in its Resolution 1001 (S/8-I), inter alia, approved the guiding principles for the organization and functioning of U.N.E.F. in accordance with the principles of "good faith" and "aid-memoire" and the Government of the United Arab Republic.

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60. 5 November 1966. Arrival of advance elements of U.N.E.F. at staging area in Naples.

61. 5-12 November 1966. Negotiations between General Hammarskjöld and President Nasser of Egypt on entry of U.N.E.F. into Egypt.

62. 12 November 1966. Agreement on U.N.E.F. entry into Egypt announced through press conference pending confirmation by United Nations Command.

63. 15 November 1966. Arrival of advance elements of U.N.E.F. in Abu Dhabi.

64. 16 November to 15 November 1966. Negotiations between Secretary General Hammarskjöld and President Nasser of Egypt on entry of U.N.E.F. into Egypt.

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